REALITIES OF URBAN CRIMINAL JUDGING
Paul B. Wice*
This article is excerpted from the forthcoming book entitled, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INNER WORKINGS

OUR URBAN CRIMINAL COURTS. The project is the culmination of
twelve years of researchinto the operation of the American criminal court system. During this period the author was involved in five
national studies which permitted him to interview approximately
five hundred judges and lawyers in fourteen major cities. From
1976 to 1978, the author was a Visiting Fellow at the United States
Justice Department's now dormant Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. Although the data reported are the result of observations and interviews conducted throughout the 1970's, the most
critical information concerning the professional behavior of the
judiciary was gathered between 1979 and 1982.
OF

From the perspective of the layman, the life of a judge appears to
be one of high status and privilege. It is viewed as a well-respected
profession which offers one the opportunity to pursue an altruistic
aim-the attempt to reach fair and just judicial decisions-while
enjoying a comfortable salary and pleasant working conditions. The
public imagines the judge arriving at his specially designated parking
space a few feet from the courthouse entrance in time for the leisurely
commencement of courtroom business at 10 a.m. Upon entering the
courthouse, doors are held and deference is extended as the judge
moves toward his chambers, exchanging morning salutations with a
seemingly endless line of well-wishers. The royal treatment continues
in his spacious, elegant offices as his secretary brings him his already
sorted correspondence along with a cup of coffee. His law clerk also is
ready for the judge's morning appearance as legal memos, schedules,
and other bits of critical information are officiously presented. Following a perusal of the morning paper and a brief ordering of the
day's business, the judge is helped on with his robe and strides purposefully into the courtroom where the bailiff announces his arrival
and demands immediate subservience.
Once in the courtroom, seated above all other participants, the
judge's power and status reach even greater heights. Lawyers, defendants, witnesses, and the courtroom audience all stand in awe, carefully trying to curry his favor. After a two to three hour morning
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session, the judge returns to his chambers for lunch, which his office
staff has obtained for him. By 2 o'clock the judge is back in the
courtroom, where he will eloquently orchestrate the proceedings before him for the next two hours. Following a conclusion of the day's
business, the judge will retire briefly to his chambers to catch up on
the latest mail and gossip, and by 5 o'clock is on his way to his palatial
residence to dine and socialize with entertaining personalities. The
summers mean two-month vacations and shorter working days. The
winters are interrupted by professional meetings in the Caribbean and
long weekends in Vermont.
Very few of the criminal court judges observed during the past
decade experienced the pleasant and productive existence described in
the preceding paragraphs; their working environment contained few
of the amenities just mentioned. Instead they found themselves in
chaotic working situations where mounting caseloads, public pressures, and dismal surroundings forced many of them to contemplate
early retirement.
Although this article will focus upon the strains and hardships
facing criminal court judges, it may be useful first to discuss some of
the positive attributes of their job. Given the abundance of negative
factors undermining a judge's professional existence, what satisfaction
do the members of this beleaguered group derive from their positions?
Most judges apologized for the altruistic nature of their response to
this question, but nevertheless stated a sincere belief in their ability to
serve the community. Within the context of a criminal proceeding,
this usually is translated into the judge's belief in his capacity to reach
a just and fair decision: a decision which will be in the best interests of
both society and the defendant. Judges seemed confident that they
could protect the defendant's constitutional guarantees from even the
most aggressive prosecutor, while also protecting the community
against a criminal element.
In fleeting moments of candor, several judges did admit that they
enjoyed the status and deferential treatment associated with their
lofty position. It was nice to have doorways opened and crowded
hallways suddenly passable as they moved through their judicial domain. In addition to such niceties, the loyalty of the judges' staffs,
extending from bailiffs through secretaries and law clerks, is another
factor permitting them to have a clear sense of their power and
prestige. Even though sociologists inform us that the status of judges,
particularly at the local level, has declined over the past few decades,
most of the judges believed that their professional status was still
elevated and that most members of the legal community remained
both envious and respectful.
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Several judges found that the intellectual challenge of their job
was its most attractive element. These judges were excited by the
constantly changing nature of the legal conundrums confronting them
each day. How could they effectively balance the needs of society
against those of the defendant's personal tragedy? How were they to
interpret the subtle and changing rhythms of the Burger Court as it
attempted to erode the decisions of the Warren Court? The case law
explosion at both the state and federal levels has driven judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors into law libraries in order to keep up
with the most recent decisions. As one Denver lawyer recounted to me
in 1977, " 'You must subscribe to everything and go to all the seminars
and collect all the advance sheets. It is crucial to pay attention to your
clients, but you must also pay attention to the intellectual side of the
criminal law.' "' Time after time the senior lawyers harked back to
the pleasures of the old days when a criminal lawyer could practice
"out of his hat," but then noted that those times were long past.
Despite the positive feelings many criminal court judges held
toward their positions, they were upset by what they perceived to be
several major liabilities in their professional lives. Although this article
will examine a wide range of problems and hardships troubling criminal court judges, the three following factors were repeatedly emphasized by most judges as being the most unpleasant aspects of their jobs:
inadequate compensation, forced involvement in politics (that is, the
necessity of winning nominations and elections), and dismal working
conditions.
Felony court judges in the cities visited earned from $40,000 to
$75,000 a year. To the general public this figure may seem to be an
impressive salary for a public official. The judges interviewed, however, were nearly unanimous in their belief that their wages were
inadequate. Most judges explained their dissatisfaction on the basis of
the significantly higher salary they thought they could be earning if
they had remained in private practice. The judges felt that on the
average they had suffered a fifty percent reduction in wages by joining
the bench, and that the differential between their judicial salaries and
their earning capacities as private practitioners was growing wider
with each passing year. Exacerbating the financial pressures was the
fact that most judges, being in their late forties and early fifties, were
the parents of children about to enter college. The reality of having to
finance this extremely expensive investment in higher education made
nearly all of the judges keenly aware of their financial limitations.
P. WICE, CRIMINAL LAWYERS: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES 102 (1978).
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Several judges stated that because of these monetary pressures they
could afford to serve only one term on the bench, and would then
return to private practice. Judges also pointed to the difficulty of
readjusting their lifestyle as a result of taking this fifty percent reduction. They and their families had become used to a certain standard of
living which, once experienced, was difficult to give up. In addition,
there were previous financial commitments such as the mortgage
payments on a home which still had to be paid despite the reduced
salary.
A few judges interviewed in each city were cynical about the
financial losses claimed to have been suffered by their colleagues as a
result of joining the bench. These judges thought that a large number
of their brethren had not been financially well off prior to becoming
judges, and actually had received increases in salary as a result of their
new positions. These judges were frequently products of a highly
politicized system of judicial selection and received their appointments as a result of many years of loyal party service. They had
frequently held bureaucratic positions within city government which
paid less than their present salaries. If they had been associated with
law firms, such associations were usually in name only. Their legal
work was more likely business-related, typically in the area of real
estate or insurance, and rarely amounted to incomes approaching
those which they currently earned on the bench.
How many judges actually have suffered significantly as a result
of joining the bench? How many have profited from this move? These
questions are almost impossible to answer. What can be concluded,
however, is that a large proportion of criminal court judges perceive
themselves as being underpaid. When judges believe that they are not
being sufficiently compensated and are thereby relative!y deprived,
their attitudes can have a negative effect on their job performance. It
seems quite plausible that the judges who complain most about their
salaries are the ones least likely to devote themselves unselfishly to
their professional responsibilities.
A second major liability for most judges is the necessity of becoming involved in local politics. Even though judges serve lengthier
elective terms than legislative and executive officials, many resent
having to enter the political arena at all. This was especially true for
judges who had been successful private practitioners before reaching
the bench, and who had only a passing exposure to local politics. They
had allowed themselves to be considered for judicial office out of a
sense of civic duty and felt that it was unnecessary and even degrading
to have to "dirty" themselves in the political process. The political
rallies, fundraisers, and closed-door strategy sessions were all despised
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diversions from their primary goal, which was simply to decide cases
and serve their cities. Whether the selection process was by election or
appointment followed by retention elections, the judges were required
to participate in the political process and interact with the local party
leadership. Lawyers who were interviewed in several cities cited their
unwillingness to enter the local political scene as the primary reason
for their reluctance to become judges, despite being likely candidates
for judicial nominations.
The third major problem which upset and depressed a high
percentage of judges revolved around unpleasant working conditions.
Even in cities such as Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, California,
where courthouses are relatively new, impressively furnished facilities, judges complained about their working 6onditions. Crowded
calendars, inadequate staffing, and ineffective security are the most
common manifestations of these undesirable conditions. The physical
deterioration of a majority of criminal courthouses has also contributed to the depressing setting. These older facilities, with inoperative
telephones, overflowing trashcans, clogged toilets, and paint peeling
from their institutional green walls serve as visible reminders of the
low status accorded to even the most prestigious criminal court judges.
Many judges came to the bench from lucrative private practices
where they were accustomed to luxurious working conditions, including opulent and spacious offices. They were typically served by competent legal secretaries, a bevy of eager law clerks, and young associates who were anxious to please. The judges who reached the bench
from these impressive law firms were usually the most upset over their
new working conditions. They could not fathom the paradoxical nature of this situation in which they were forced to suffer a degrading
reduction in the quality of their work environment as a "reward" for
achieving their elevated professional status.
Even more troublesome to most judges than their depressing
physical surroundings was their vulnerability to physical attack as a
result of the absence of reliable security measures. Nearly every judge
interviewed recounted some incident experienced by himself or one of
his colleagues. While these incidents varied in seriousness from verbal
abuse to aggressive assaults, all were terrifying. Presently, any judge
who works after dark may request an armed escort to his car. So many
courts are understaffed in terms of security, however, that after 4
o'clock, hallways and chambers are left unprotected, and judges are
fairly easy prey for any vengeful defendant. Judges are acutely aware
of this problem and, like the general public, live in fear of criminal
attack.
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Having discussed the major liabilities and assets associated with
the position of criminal court judge, this article will now focus on
those specific strains and hardships which the judge experiences in
attempting to carry out his professional responsibilities. The first
problem area- sentencing-was agreed upon by all the judges as
being the most difficult as well as the most frustrating aspect of their
job.
I. SENTENCING

Although the judges stated a variety of reasons, there was general
agreement that sentencing was the most frustrating and perplexing
part of their job. Many judges expressed discomfort with the responsibility placed upon them for making a decision so heavily laden with
serious consequences. Nearly all of the judges were cognizant of the
horrible conditions awaiting a defendant sentenced to serve time in a
penal institution. The judges were aware that not only would the
defendant lose his freedom for a long period of time, and be separated
from his friends and family, but that there was a great likelihood that
the defendant would be beaten, robbed, and possibly raped by his
fellow inmates. Judges also knew that in nearly every case the defendant would eventually reemerge into society unchanged except for
being more bitter and more inclined toward a life of crime.
Complicating the emotional strain under which judges must
reach sentencing decisions is the increasing public outcry against the
supposed leniency of their decisions. The mass media, concerned citizen groups, local politicians, and members of the law enforcement
establishment such as police and prosecutors have united in their
criticism of judicial sentencing. Police and prosecutors, in particular,
have been quite vocal in their disparaging remarks. The judges realize
that police and prosecutors may be motivated in part by a desire to
shift the spotlight away from their own crimefighting inadequacies,
but the public appears convinced that judges and their ineffective
sentencing decisions are a primary reason for the breakdown in society's ability to control crime and keep local neighborhoods safe.
In addition to the great pressure and responsibility involved in
sentencing, a lack of reliable background information on the defendant hampers the judge's efforts to reach an informed decision. A
controversy is currently brewing in the New York County criminal
courts, as judges and probation department officers blame one another for pre-sentence reports being both seriously delayed and
fraught with errors and omissions. The judges have charged that the
quality of pre-sentence reports has deteriorated to the point where
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they are of very little use in sentencing decisions. The probation
department has countered by stating that the judges have placed
unreasonable time and workload pressures on its depleted staff, and
are using the probation department as a scapegoat.
A final problem for judges attempting to conscientiously balance
the needs of the defendant and society during the dispositional process
is the absence of viable alternative forms of treatment for the defendant. The judge can either send the defendant to prison for a period of
years or return him to the community by placing him on probation.
The selection of prison seems to offer only a temporary solution since
the defendant will eventually be released, angrier, and possibly more
adroit in his criminal activities. Given the unrealistically large caseloads of probation officers, the defendant placed on probation receives
almost no supervision or guidance, and is likely to be arrested for
another crime. For the defendant with special psychological or physical problems, the chances of receiving viable help are also negligible.
Halfway houses and other shelter alternatives in the community have
not been established in sufficient numbers to provide a meaningful
alternative except in a few isolated instances. Federal, state, and local
budget reductions have also undermined these rehabilitative and reform efforts.
The present criticism of judicial sentencing has grown from the
public's belief that the courts have been both too lenient and inconsistent. The result has been a perceived pattern of irrational and undesirable sentencing decisions in which both the defendants and the general public are being penalized. Defendants convicted of the same
crime are seen to receive divergent sentences. The judges defend such
variation on the basis of their obligation to individualize each sentencing decision, considering unique factors which relate to the specific
needs of the defendant.
Within the past decade a majority of state legislatures have responded to this public clamor by increasing the severity of available
sentences while reducing the discretionary power of the judge by
creating determinant rather than indeterminant sentences. With determinant sentences, once a defendant is found guilty of a particular
crime, the judge must sentence him to a narrow range of minimum
and maximum years or months. Additional restraints may be placed
on the judge's sentencing choices depending upon whether the defendant has prior felony convictions, whether these convictions involved
violence, whether a gun was used in the current offense, whether the
victim was a senior citizen, or whether heroin or some other danger-

236

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:229

ous drug was used or sold in large quantities. If any of these factors are
present in the defendant's case, the judge is directed to alter his
sentence as dictated by each of these special circumstances.
Most of the judges interviewed were not pleased with the shift
from indeterminant to determinant sentences. Many judges were also
upset by what they felt was an unnecessary stiffening of sentences,
believing that the existing lengths had been sufficiently severe. The
leniency issue, however, was not nearly as important to the judges as
the lessening of their discretionary powers. Judges object to the reduction of their sentencing power because of its inhibiting effect upon
their ability to reach what they believe to be a just disposition. Confident of his expertise, educated by his experience, the judge believes
that he can only reach an intelligent sentencing disposition by being
allowed to consider a wide range of mitigating factors concerning the
defendant's background and any unusual aspects surrounding a particular crime. The opportunity to ponder a wide range of factors and
utilize a variety of sentencing alternatives enables the judge effectively
to fit the disposition to both the crime and the defendant. This particularistic style of sentencing was an outgrowth of penal reforms dating
back to the 1920's,2 and reflected a need to treat each defendant as an
individual. Thus, the presence of disparities between individuals
charged with the same crime was not a problem to be lamented, but
rather a reflection of the judge's recognition of the unique circumstances in each case, and a testimony to the judge's perspicacity and
care.
What are the factors a judge considers in the sentencing decision?
Many judges try to inquire into the defendant's background in order
to determine whether the present criminal activity has followed a
discernible trend of antisocial behavior, or was an. aberration in an
otherwise law-abiding lifetime. Unfortunately, many defendants do
not fall completely within either category. If they did exhibit such
clear-cut patterns, judges would have a fairly easy time with the
sentencing decision. Those defendants with consistent patterns of
criminal behavior would be sent to jail and those who had committed
an isolated act would receive probation. A given defendant, however,
is more likely to have had an earlier criminal record but one which
involved less serious crimes. Another may have had a conviction for a
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felony, but it could have occurred many years earlier, perhaps when
he was a juvenile. During the intervening years, he may have had a
clean slate.
Judges also consider a defendant's previous opportunities for rehabilitation. If, prior to his current offense, the defendant seemed to
be making a sincere effort to put his life back in order, a second or
third chance may be offered. On the other hand, when a defendant
has failed to avail himself of opportunities which the court has offered
in the past such as a drug program, vocational training, or psychiatric
counseling, the court is more likely to give up on the defendant and
sentence him to prison. The attitude and motivation of the defendant
as manifested through his track record in these rehabilitative programs are of crucial significance to the judge. In fact, in cases where a
sentence of imprisonment was possible but not statutorily mandated,
these appeared to be the most persuasive factors in the judge's decision. Often a defendant is thought to have insulted the court by his
refusal to take advantage of an earlier, generous opportunity for a
second chance.
The judge is willing to read character references on behalf of the
defendant as submitted by the defense attorney, but the facts of the
pre-sentence report concerning the seriousness of the present offense,
the defendant's past criminal record, and his willingness to participate
in previous rehabilitative programs combine to provide the information most influential to the judge's sentencing decision. The prosecutor
usually attempts to counter the defense attorney's plea for leniency
with an equally unrealistic recommendation stressing the need to
protect society from sociopaths such as the defendant. Most judges,
particularly those sentencing large numbers of defendants after accepting a guilty plea, are unmoved by the posturing of both prosecution and defense, and generally adopt a reasonable compromise position.
As more and more jurisdictions grow upset over supposed judicial
leniency and sentencing disparities, determinant sentencing statutes
are being enacted, usually in combination with lengthier sentences.
This means that not only are the judges given a narrower range of
alternatives (i.e., a five to seven year term instead of a two to ten year
term), but certain categories of crimes and defendants must receive
specific sentences. Many states enacting such legislation have separated crimes into a number of classifications on the basis of severity.
Any defendant who falls within a given category must receive a
particular sentence depending upon the number and type of previous
convictions. New York State terms defendants with previous felony
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convictions "predicate felons. ' 3 If a weapon was used in these earlier
crimes, they fall into the most serious grouping termed "violent predicate felons."-4 In addition to determinant sentencing statutes, states
have attempted to utilize several other reforms. One of the most
popular is "presumptive sentencing" provisions such as those found in
New Jersey. 5 Under presumptive sentencing, the legislature recommends a particular sentence for a specific charge. If the judge chooses
to go beyond the narrow limits of this recommendation, he must
submit a written report justifying such action. Any sentencing deviation must be supported by information relating to relevant mitigating
circumstances or unique personal situations.
The judges, clearly aware of the public sentiment against themselves and their brethren, have attempted for several decades to reform their sentencing practices. These efforts have resulted in both
educative and institutional reforms which have been geared primarily
toward resolving the disparity question. The educative reforms are
typified by the development of sentencing seminars such as those
offered at the popular National College of Judges in Reno, Nevada.
These programs, usually one to two weeks in duration, attempt to
show judges how differing personal perspectives can influence their
sentencing decisions. Hypothetical case histories of defendants are
distributed to the judges in attendance and each must impose his own
sentence and then explain it to his colleagues. The judges quickly
realize how their personal backgrounds and individual personalities
influence their ability to impose particular sentences. The National
College of Judges believes that if judges are educated as to the divergent opinions held by their colleagues, they will be more careful in the
future to control personal prejudices affecting their professional behavior. Whether these seminars can have long-range effects upon a
judge's sentencing proclivities has never been conclusively established.
Critics of these programs believe they are little more than busman's
holidays, with the many diversions of Reno serving to diminish the
seminars' impact upon judicial behavior.
Other reforms such as sentencing councils and appellate review
of sentences have also attempted to reduce unwarranted disparities by
developing procedures whereby judges supervise each other's sentenc-

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.04 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(f) (West 1982) (criteria for withholding or imposing
sentence of imprisonment).
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ing, in some instances requiring written justifications from one another." The sentencing council is a multijudge court, several members
of which meet periodically to consider what sentences should be
imposed in pending cases. Used primarily by federal district courts,
this procedure shows participating judges their differing sentencing
practices and offers a forum in which these differences can be debated
and a consensus formed. The most bothersome aspect of the councils is
the permitting of judges to meet prior to the sentencing hearing. This
means that the sentencing judge, who has final responsibility for the
sentencing, may have his objectivity impaired by the council's earlier
discussions.
Although appellate review of sentences which fail to conform to
statutory limits has long been authorized, nearly one-third of the
states do not permit appellate review on the merits of a sentence.
Nevertheless, a growing number of states have interpreted their general review statutes to grant such authority for appellate review.
Usually this review is conducted by the regular appellate division,
although a handful of states have created special courts staffed with
7
experienced judges solely for the purpose of reviewing sentences.
Several judges interviewed were upset by appellate review and sentencing councils, viewing these reforms as an indication of the lack of
faith of their colleagues in their ability to reach appropriate dispositions. Such review mechanisms were believed to be another example
of trial court judges losing power as a result of public frustration over
the rising crime rate. For some judges, this was especially upsetting
because it was their fellow members of the bench who wilted under
public pressure. These reforms were expected to heighten tensions
between trial and appellate judges. Nevertheless, as such reforms are
still in the embryonic stages and affect only a minority of jurisdictions,
it is premature for both judges and critics to offer conclusions as to
their long-range consequences.
The large majority of criminal court judges, perhaps because
they realized the importance of their sentencing responsibilities, spent
a great deal of time agonizing over these decisions. An equally
weighty factor causing the judges to anguish over sentencing decisions
was their increasing awareness of the horrible conditions presently
existing in the various state penitentiaries. A prison sentence constitutes not only loss of freedom but most likely means subjecting the
6
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defendant to various forms of violence rampant within prison walls. A
final influence upon the judge is the serious overcrowding in nearly all
state prisons. Sentenced defendants commonly must wait months in
county detention centers before there is a vacancy in a state facility.
All of these factors combine to convince a judge that only the most
heinous criminals deserve to be sent to prison. As judges are aware
that only the toughest criminal will be able to survive in these institutions, many defendants who might previously have been sentenced to
prison are receiving probation. It was also interesting to note that
several judges made it their practice to follow-up on defendants after
sentencing and recognized a responsibiity for informing defendants as
to the perils of incarceration and guiding them toward a possible
return to respectability.
II. OUTSIDE PRESSURE
Various external pressures affect judicial behavior and the overall
performance of the local criminal justice system. These include the
media, local politicians, community groups, and the appellate courts
in addition to several broader sociocultural variables. Given the specific theme of this article, I will briefly examine the effects of criticism
from several of these groups, and discuss why this verbal abuse constitutes one of the most unpleasant aspects of the job of a criminal court
judge.
Judges feel that independence from these outside groups is critical
to preserving the climate necessary for them to perform their job with
optimal objectivity and effectiveness. Although judges rarely offer
public reactions when this independence is compromised by the intrusion of these external influences, they seethe internally and grow
increasingly aloof from the public they are sworn to serve. Nevertheless, during the years I spent observing and interviewing judges, they
usually reserved their most acerbic private comments for those media
and local political figures who had maligned their professional efforts.
Most judges are successful in their efforts to avoid the media's
spotlight. They are careful to abstain from pretrial decisions, plea
bargains, or sentences which can be expected to upset and possibly
outrage the public. Judges acknowledge that the media, in the words
of one Philadelphia judge, "can really do a number on you if they
want to."' This awareness has a chilling effect on judicial behavior: As

I

Interview with Philadelphia criminal court judge (Summer 1980).
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judges are well aware, pro-prosecution decisions will rarely raise the
public concern or media attention aroused by decisions which appear
lenient.
Approximately one-third of the judges interviewed, however, did
not seem to be intimidated by the possible repercussions from public
exposure of their courtroom actions. These judges, who were typically
less prosecution-oriented than their more reticent brethren, appeared
to almost relish the media's attention and delight in flashing their
judicial opinions dramatically before the public. Their more reserved
colleagues are often the harshest critics of these outspoken judges.
Mutterings of grandstanding, overly active egos, and political careerism are typically directed towards those judges basking in the public
eye.
Today, a growing number of judges do seem willing to move into
the limelight and abandon the protected isolation of the courtroom.
They justify their newfound courage and loquacity on the basis of an
urgent need to correct the public belief that the criminal courts are a
major cause of urban crime problems. Unwilling to remain scapegoats
for the failings of society in general and the criminal justice system in
particular, these judges feel it important to educate the local public as
to the realities and complexities of crime and of their city's method of
dealing with it. One judge went so far as to urge his colleagues to
bring citizens from the community, especially high school students,
into their courtrooms in order to show them how the system actually
operates. He had been performing such quasi-educational courtroom
sessions himself for many years, and felt it was probably his most
worthwhile achievement. 9
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE TEDIUM

Almost all of the judges interviewed stated that one of the most
annoying aspects of their job was the administrative tedium. They
complained not only of the ever-increasing demands for paperwork
from their superiors, but of the frustrating lack of cooperation from
other public agencies upon whom they depend for critical information. One retired judge commented that he was so busy with administrative details that he had no time to think. He felt that he was
becoming more of a clerk and less of a judge.' 0 The bureaucratic spirit
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of the state and federal government has clearly permeated the local
criminal courts. Judges in several cities reported being required to
keep a time sheet in which they had to record how they spent each
hour of the working day, including the length of their lunches.
Some degree of administrative frustration is the expected byproduct of an overworked and understaffed court system in which
many diverse parties and agencies, including those in aggressive competition with one another, must be convinced or cajoled into cooperating. The often chaotic scenes observed in the nation's courthouses
illustrate the wide range of individuals who must be coordinated
before a judge can begin to process a case. This complex process begins
as early as the preliminary hearing and is repeated at every subsequent
appearance. The public defender or defense counsel must be present
with his client and in possession of the proper case file. The prosecutor
must also be prepared with the defendant's prior record and a copy of
the police department's arrest report, as well as statements from witnesses and any other relevant information. If the defendant had failed
to make bail and was detained in the local jail, the sheriff's department must have him in the courtroom. The judge may also wish to see
any preliminary reports from the probation department relevant to
the defendant's background. The arresting police officer is often required to be present and to bring any necessary evidentiary material.
The situation is further complicated where additional state or federal
law enforcement agencies (e.g., FBI, State Police, Military Police,
Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration Bureau) possess important
information relevant to the case. The judge, finally, must also turn to
his clerk to make sure he has before him the proper case folder, which
lists all previous court action taken with regard to the case.
The odds are highly in favor of one or more of the previously
mentioned individuals or documents not being in the proper place at
the proper time. Additionally, when one realizes that the average case
involves six court appearances, it becomes easier to understand that
each case represents an ongoing bureaucratic nightmare for the criminal court judge. On the basis of the author's many years of courtroom
observation, especially at pretrial proceedings where a large number
of cases must be processed, it seems fair to estimate that every other
case, and frequently two cases out of three, come before the judge
lacking some critical individual or document. This necessitates a postponement until a future date when everyone can try again. At this
subsequent proceeding, the odds improve only slightly that all required elements will be present, enabling the case to be processed.
Judges do appear to be able to exercise a limited degree of influence in reducing the number of postponements. This may be accom-
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plished either by gaining a reputation as a no-nonsense judge who will
consistently penalize tardiness, or by unmercifully driving one's self
and one's staff in a never-ending struggle to control the docket and to
ensure the prompt appearance of all parties. Judges who adopt either
of these styles, and especially the latter, run a strong risk of antagonizing their personal staff as well as the courtroom workgroup. These
tensions can cause the other actors to become uncooperative or recalcitrant, and eventually be counterproductive to the judge's laudatory
goals. Thus, the judge who becomes abrasive in striving for courtroom
efficiency may be less successful in his search than a more complacent
judge who slogs through his pile of cases in a relaxed and friendly
manner.
The court administrator is the public official whose position was
created in order to assist the judge in tackling these burdensome tasks.
The powers of this administrative judge and those of his administrative assistants varies signficantly from city to city, but generally one
expects this official to be held accountable for controlling the behavior
of his management specialists. It is ironic that despite the fact that
these administrative officials were developed for the purpose of aiding
the judges with their managerial responsibilities, they have, at least in
the eyes of most judges, made the judge's professional lives more
miserable by appreciably increasing the amount of tedious paperwork
which must be completed.
The administrative judges and their staff are likely targets for
frustrated judges drowning in files, records, and miscellaneous documents. Also, because the court administrators are technically responsible for the working conditions, including the deteriorating physical
plant and vanishing professional amenities, they are blamed for all of
the problems that upset the judges. As the minor irritations continue
to mount and to multiply in both frequency and severity, the hostility
of the criminal court judge also begins to escalate. When the air
conditioning system malfunctions during the same day that the copy
machine breaks down and a law clerk is mugged in the bathroom, the
judge is likely to point to the Office of Court Administrator as the
primary cause of all his woes.
Several administrative judges are able to survive in this nerveracking environment by utilizing a "stick and carrot" method of dealing with the judges. The administrative judge has power to control,
among other things, which chambers a judge may be assigned, which
courtroom he will have, and who his bailiffs will be. These are all
critical factors affecting the quality of the judge's professional existence. It may, therefore, behoove the judge to cooperate with his
presiding or administrative judge as much as possible, for the alterna-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:229

tive may lead to a very unpleasant tenure on the bench. Since all
judges in a particular jurisdiction receive nearly the same salary, their
only way of indicating their relative superiority is in their possession of
better offices or more stylish courtrooms. The administrators hold the
keys to both status and comfort in the criminal courthouse!
It must be noted that the judges themselves are not entirely
blameless for this administrative chaos. Their prior experience as
attorneys, assisted by a handful of loyal clerks and secretaries, has not
prepared them for the massive and detailed administrative responsibilities presently facing them. Scheduling cases, dealing with various
public bureaucracies, shuffling an endless flow of records and documents are all tasks which most judges have never had to confront. An
insensitive public, inadequate staff, and budget-cutting legislators
only exacerbate this already serious dilemma. The fragmented efforts
to deal with these administrative problems through increased use of
computers as well as additional training for the staff do not seem
adequate as a response to so deep-rooted a problem.
IV.

MAINTAINING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM

Nearly all judges are concerned with disorder in their courtrooms. They fear outbursts from attorneys, defendants, and courtroom spectators. Nevertheless, actual incidents observed during my
twelve years of investigations as well as those recounted by the nearly
one hundred judges interviewed revealed the extreme rarity of such
occurrences. In the definitive study of courtroom disorder conducted
by Norman Dorsen and associates under the auspices of the Bar Association of the City of New York, 107 judges, responding to a questionnaire sent to 4600 trial judges throughout the United States, reported
a total of 112 cases of disorder in their courtrooms."I The results of the
study, known as the Dorsen Report, indicate that these incidents
occurred most frequently during serious felony cases, although there
were instances of disorder in a surprising number of divorce proceedings (eight). Seventy-four of the cases involved criminal defendants
(thirteen of whom were later found to be mentally disturbed) while
seventeen were spectators and eight were attorneys. The court dealt
with these disturbances by issuing contempt citations (thirty-two),
warnings (twenty-four), binding and gagging of defendants (seventeen), removal from the courtroom (thirteen), declaring a mistrial
(one), and clearing the courtroom (one).12
11N.

DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DIsoRDER IN THE COURT 6 (1973).
12 Id. at 275.
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Despite the serious nature of most of these courtroom incidents,
the empirical evidence from the Dorsen Report clearly indicated their
rarity. Only two percent of the large national sample of trial judges
questioned were able to report even a single incident taking place in
their courtroom.' 3 Nevertheless, because the number of incidents does
seem to be on the rise, and even more importantly, because the judges
and members of the local bar associations are so concerned with the
problem, it has assumed a prominence justifying a brief discussion
within this article.
The types of behavior problems facing a judge and his level of
concern about such problems depend a great deal upon whether it is
the defendant or one of the opposing attorneys causing the problem.
Defendants have been found to commit the following categories of
misbehavior: passive disrespect, isolated emotional outbursts, noncooperation and repeated interruptions. Presented in ascending order of
severity, the list is also in descending order of frequency. The overwhelming number of incidents which I observed involved passive
disrespect. It appears that at least ninety percent of the total number
of incidents fall into either this category or that of "single outbursts."
The frequency of the disrespect was so high in several courtrooms
that it appeared the judges were barely cognizant of the contemptuous
attitude of the defendants. Although common sense would seem to
dictate that one dress and behave in a manner least likely to antagonize the judge, in situations such as arraignments and sentencing
hearings, defendants often do not do so. Despite the seriousness of
these proceedings in which the defendant's freedom is at stake, defendant after defendant (especially those between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-four) was unwilling to alter his insulting manner and
appearance. This obvious lack of respect toward the judge and the
court was manifested through slouching postures, grunting responses,
and sullen stares.
Early research in Detroit's Records Court clearly supports the
premise that judges penalize defendants who appear disrespectful in
their courtroom (and conversely reward those defendants who try to
placate the judge by exhibiting remorse and respect). Thus, it is truly
puzzling that defendants persist in their masochistic ritual. One can

1' Id. at 6.
14
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only imagine that there is a strong belief in the necessity for maintaining a "macho image" in front of friends and spectators in the courtroom. Deference to the court may be equated with weakness, and no
sign of weakness is to be shown, even if one's lack of deference is
certain to cause serious personal hardship. Some defendants may also
believe, along with the general public, in the leniency of the courts,
and in a revolving door system of justice in which the courts are
unwilling to treat cases seriously. These defendants fail to realize that
as they become older and their crimes grow more serious, the court's
patience will run out, and lengthy prison terms will replace the
expected probationary sentences received in the past. Their previous
guilty pleas may have lulled them into believing the myth that the
court is impotent-a myth which will explode before them as they
realize too late that they have finally gone too far.
The other forms of defendant misconduct-isolated outbursts,
noncooperation, and repeated interruptions-all occur during that
procedural rarity, the trial. The defendant, a virtual nonparticipant
for most of this proceeding, may be driven to these emotional outbursts out of frustration with the slow-paced and at times incomprehensible legal maneuvering. Many defendants also sense the higher
stakes involved in a trial, usually reserved for the most serious cases.
By refusing to plead guilty, the defendant understands that he is
risking a lengthy sentence if convicted. Pretrial court appearances are
frequently of so short a duration and of such narrow scope that the
defendant lacks both the time and purpose for misbehavior.
When a defendant does misbehave, the judge has a wide range of
available sanctions. These extend from the more commonly utilized
preventive strategies such as issuing a warning or negotiating a solution to the more repressive tactics of holding the defendant in contempt, removing him from the courtroom, or binding and gagging.
Most defendants who receive these rarely dispensed sanctions are
either mentally ill or suffering from emotional distress. During twelve
years of observation, I witnessed only one incident in which a defendant was removed from the courtroom.
Attorneys may also be disciplined by the judge for misbehavior.
These infractions include making disrespectful remarks, refusing to
obey proper court procedures, using purposefully obstructionist or
dilatory tactics, and repetitive or excessive argumentation. These
forms of misbehavior, especially the use of the questionable delay
tactics or overly aggressive cross-examination of witnesses, may take
on either blatant or subtle manifestations. When a judge believes that
a lawyer has intentionally and repeatedly engaged in these forms of
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misbehavior, he may sanction the attorney through any of the following methods: civil or criminal contempt citations, discipline by the
local bar association, suspension of the right to practice, or removal of
out-of-state lawyers' permission to practice. Formal sanctions are extremely rare. Of the more than one hundred judges who responded to
the Dorsen questionnaire, only one reported sanctioning an attorney:
a criminal contempt citation jailing the lawyer overnight.
In conclusion, although there seems to be a slight trend toward
increasing disrespect for the judiciary, the number of actual incidents
remains miniscule. Judges interviewed disdained use of sanctions except in the most serious cases. They believed that any judge who was
willing to use his contempt power with any degree of frequency was
indicating a critical weakness in both his judicial temperament and his
ability to control his courtroom.
V.

JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

Judges themselves are not immune from occasional transgressions. Even though instances of judicial misbehavior are rare, they are
still an issue of great public concern. As was seen in the forms of
attorney and defendant misbehavior, judicial misconduct can range
along a broad continuum from the relatively minor to the very serious. Also, as was discovered with regard to attorneys and defendants,
the preponderance of incidents cluster at the less serious end of the
spectrum. Examples of these less serious types of judicial misconduct
are acts of rudeness or bias and forms of undignified behavior. These
acts commonly occur when judges are being overly aggressive in their
questioning of witnesses or commenting too frequently on evidence.
Both of these types of judicial behavior may give the impression of
partisanship to the jury and spectators. This problem can also be seen
in the perceived abuse of attorneys, which implies an unprofessional
preference for or hostility toward one of the adversaries. This last
topic, although it may only be categorized as a "less serious" form of
judicial misconduct, is the most common type, and can have a significant impact upon the ultimate outcome of the trial.
Given the chaotic conditions found in the courtroom and the
various pressures exerted upon criminal judges, it is not surprising that
they may not be able to continually maintain a calm and dispassionate
temperament. The frustrations of needless delays, incomplete records,
insolent defendants, and incompetent attorneys all contribute to a
debilitating and enervating judicial experience. Occasionally, one
does find a judge who lacks the character traits essential to dispensing
the judicial function, and whose anger quickly rises to the surface.
Frustration may cause the judge to become rude or abusive toward
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attorneys, defendants, or anyone else in close proximity when his
temper reaches the boiling point.
The more serious categories of judicial misconduct are the result
of either the incompetence or venality of the judge. Although these
transgressions are extremely rare, they are always important media
events. In this post-Watergate period of heightened citizen scrutiny of
public officials and their moral behavior, the media devotes a great
deal of attention to any breach of the public faith, especially by a
judge. One student of the subject, Charles Ashman, believed the
problem to be so widespread that he wrote a book on the subject
entitled The Finest Judges Money Can Buy, and has toured the nation
expounding on the topic of judicial corruption.' 5
Ashman has collected the case studies of nearly two hundred
corrupt judges. His book contains chapters on the relationship between organized crime and the judiciary, judicial avarice, moral
decadence, "court jesters," and political manipulators and grafters.
His compilation offers a frightening portrait, but one must realize that
he is covering all federal and state judges for a forty year period.
Without minimizing the problem, nearly all research in this area
has found judicial malfeasance to be a very rare occurrence. Certainly
judges lose their tempers, raise their voices, and permit their emotions
to be observed by everyone in the courtroom on a daily basis. This,
however, seems to be much more a product of courtroom pressures
than of an abundance of unsuited, ill-tempered judges who should be
relieved of their duties. In addition to devising a much needed system
for spotting and removing those judges who cannot stand the strains
and tensions of the criminal courtroom, it seems to make even greater
sense to focus reforming energies upon the sources of courtroom confusion and implement policies geared toward its reduction.
When a judge does begin to exhibit a pattern of behavior which
threatens his legitimacy as a neutral arbiter and compassionate dispenser of justice, it is critical that action be taken. Even if instances of
such misconduct are rare, they serve to undermine the credibility and
efficacy of the entire judicial structure. The public demands its judges
to be not only fair but also to give the appearance of fairness. Anything less will seriously weaken the public's confidence in the criminal
courts.
Why should judges, given their lofty position, even be tempted to
commit an act of malfeasance? Many judges, especially those who
have served on the bench for a long period of time, may become so

15 C.
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frustrated seeing guilty defendants pass through their courtrooms that
they believe themselves justified in bending the law so as to bring
about what they perceive to be a more socially desirable end. After
sitting on the bench some judges may begin to think they are the law
and believe that they must actively pursue those ends which they
know to be right, despite the fact that this may cause them to utilize
questionable and at times unlawful means. They are encouraged in
this pursuit because of their knowledge that most of what they do is
unreviewable by appellate courts, and that other sanctions are almost
never used.
What types of sanctions are available to discipline a judge? The
oldest and most cumbersome is impeachment, which is occasionally
threatened but almost never used. Appellate review and investigation
by local bar associations have been tried in several jurisdictions, but in
the past decade the most popular method has been investigations
conducted by commissions or boards of inquiry. These institutions
seem to be modeled after either the California or New York systems.
In New York, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct has no
investigative arm, no screening mechanism, and appears to be dominated by the state legislature and governor. Their most recent action
(March 1, 1983), censuring a judge for addressing a female lawyer
derisively as a "little girl," has not helped the credibility of the Commission. The New York Times reported that "Six of the nine members
of the Commission made up of judges, lawyers, and private citizens,
felt that [the justice] should be publicly admonished. Two thought he
had behaved improperly, but voted to admonish him privately. One
said the Justice has done nothing wrong, that the lawyer was too
sensitive, and the Commission was overreacting.' 6
The California Commission on Judicial Qualifications is composed of five judges appointed by the state supreme court, two lawyers appointed by the state bar association, and two laymen appointed
by the governor. The Commission has a permanent staff and in addition uses outside investigators. It can act on its own initiative in a wide
range of cases. The Commission has been fairly successful in resolving
disciplinary matters quietly and informally. Professor Albert Alschuler, in his study of courtroom misconduct, discovered that the Commission receives approximately one hundred complaints each year,
most of them from angry litigants. 17 Two-thirds of the complaints
" Shipp, Judge Censuredfor Addressing Lawyer as 'Girl,' N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1983, at B1,
col. 1.
" Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 Tax. L. REV. 629,
703 (1972).
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were settled by the staff. Only three cases were referred to the state
supreme court, and fifty judges resigned while their cases were under
investigation. Alschuler concluded that:
[t]he California experience has demonstrated that a commission
system can be effective in disciplining judges for abusive courtroom
behavior. Nevertheless, one may have an uneasy feeling about a
regime that emphasizes confidentiality, that accomplishes its
results primarily through backroom settlements, and that is dominated by members of the elite professional group that it is designed
to control. I
One additional jurisdiction which I visited, Washington, D.C.,
appeared to be operating a viable disciplinary institution. The city
utilizes a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure formulated
and operated in a manner similar to the California system, but with
broader powers. In addition to dealing with discipline and involuntary retirements, the Commission is responsible for approving reappointments. In 1976 and 1977 they handled thirty-two complaints
regarding conduct and eventually conducted one disciplinary proceeding. Their main task seemed to be supervising reappointment
proceedings for four members of the city's superior court whose terms
were ending. 19

Even the seemingly effective commissions in California and the
District of Columbia seemed to have a minimal impact upon curbing
the problem of judicial misconduct. Judges, like most professional
groups, do not wish to "hang their dirty linen out in public." They
would much prefer to deal with their erring colleagues through informal pressure. No one wants to be the first to point an accusing finger,
since all judges realize that they too could soon be on the wrong end of
a commission inquiry. In addition to these rather expected complications, the cumbersome bureaucracy of the courts also emerges as a
serious obstacle to expeditious decisionmaking.
In concluding this section on judicial misconduct, it must be
remembered that the number of venal or corrupt judges in our judicial system appears very small. There are many judges who lack the
proper judicial temperament, abuse attorneys, or act prejudicially in
favor of one of the parties, but thankfully, the actual number who
intentionally commit acts of malfeasance while on the bench remains
extremely small. The other problems of abusive and ill-tempered
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judges are not to be ignored and must be addressed if we are to restore
the public faith in our urban justice system. I believe, however, that
this can best be accomplished by improving the judge's working conditions and allowing for criminal court decisions to be made in a safe
and sane atmosphere, free from the turbulence and confusion which
presently exists.
CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to portray the professional behavior of
the judge as he attempts to wrestle with the daily demands of his
position. It is hoped that by better understanding the complex problems which the felony court judge must face, as well as appreciating
the inhospitable environment in which his difficult task must be performed, the public will be in a better position to take intelligent and
compassionate steps towards improving the fairness and effectiveness
of the urban justice system.

